1 The findings in this article were presented at the Yeshiva College Jewish Studies Faculty Colloquium, a session on Biblical Law at the 2010 annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Atlanta, and at a seminar at the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations. Thanks are due to the members of the audiences at all these venues for their stimulating reactions. Professors L. Fitzgerald, G. Rendsburg, J. Stackert, B. Wells and A. Holtz, the author's father, all read previous drafts and made helpful comments. The final version was greatly improved by F. R. Magdalene's thorough critique. Translations are the author's own, made in consultation with published ones.

2 In addition to dictionary entries for the terms and commentaries on the verses themselves, see the relevant references in the index to P. Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, trans. M. J. Smith, JSOT.S 105, Sheffield 1994, 465–478 and F. R. Magdalene, On the Scales of Righteousness: Neo-Babylonian Trial Law and the Book of Job, BJS 348, Providence, R. I. 2007, 116; 159; 194–195 (on d-b-r and n-g-d); 120–121; 166; 195 (on š-m-ʿ); 206 (on k-w-n). For additional observations on š-m-ʿ, in particular, see H. Cazelles, Institutions et terminologie en Deut. i 6–7, in: G.W. Anderson, et. al. (eds.), Volume du congrès: Genève 1965, VT.S 15, Leiden 1966, (97–112), 110; M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, Oxford 1972, 245–247; and M. Malul, Knowledge, Control and Sex: Studies in Biblical Thought, Culture and Worldview, Tel Aviv-Jaffa 2002, 196–197.

3 Bovati considers Jer 8:6 and Job 5:27 together with Dtn 17:4 as illustrations of how “the conclusion of the investigation brings out the concept of true and false” (Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, [above n. 2], 252–253). Bovati does not, however, address the broader trial pattern in the biblical or extra-biblical material.

4 In addition to the entries in AHw and CAD, see the relevant references in the indexes to E. Dombradi, Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozessurkunden, FAOS 20, Stuttgart 1996, Vol. 2, 363–366 and S. E. Holtz, Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure, Cuneiform Monographs 38, Leiden 2009, 334–335.

5 Comparative evidence has been brought to bear on the forensic interpretations of the individual components of the sequence. For example, regarding the verb š-m-ʿ in the Hebrew Bible, see Cazelles, Institutions et terminologie (above n.2), 109–111; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy (above n. 2), 245–247; and idem, Judge and Officer in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East, Israel Oriental Studies 7, 1977, (65–88), 80. Cazelles includes Neo-Babylonian material in his list of Akkadian parallels, but does not engage it beyond this listing (Institutions et terminologie, [above n.2], 110, n. 1).

6 R. Westbrook suggests the analogy of “a new set of clothes”. R. Westbrook, A Matter of Life and Death, in: B. Wells / F. R. Magdalene (eds.), Law from the Tigris to the Tiber: The Writings of Raymond Westbrook, Winona Lake, Ind. 2009, Vol. 2, (251–264), 255; repr. from JANESCU 25 (1997).

7 The absence of a direct quotation, a general term for speech (e.g., dibrê), or any other description of a perceivable sound confirm this interpretation. The rare use of bên in Dtn 1:16 (compare Jud 11:10) is another grammatical factor that contributes to the judicial interpretation, as noted by Cazelles, Institutions et terminologie (above n. 2), 110.

8 For example, Bovati suggests that these verses are evidence of a “literary scheme that interprets the progress of history in a juridical and judicial manner” (Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, [above n. 2], 324).

9 For a thorough discussion, see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, (above n. 2), 120–121.

10 C. A. Newsom, The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations, Oxford 2003, 150.

11 For similar observations on the general value of the Neo-Babylonian texts, see B. Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes, BZAR 4, Wiesbaden 2004, 3–4 and Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness (above n. 2), 3–4.

12 The available data militate against seeing more direct influence of Neo-Babylonian legal formulations on the Hebrew Bible's trial descriptions. In this regard, too, the situation is analogous to matters of the law's substance. B. Wells, writing about testimony law, has correctly observed that the existence of Neo-Babylonian parallels to pentateuchal laws does not imply that the laws date to the Neo-Babylonian period. See Wells, Testimony (above n. 11), 158–167. The idea of a long-standing common legal tradition is most directly associated with the writings of R. Westbrook, which are conveniently summarized, with important references, in B. Wells, Introduction: The Idea of a Shared Tradition, in Wells and Magdalene (eds.), Law from the Tigris to the Tiber (above n. 6), Vol. 1, xi–xx. Also see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness (above n. 2), 31, with literature cited in n. 16.

13 Holtz, Court Procedure (above n. 4), 27–46. For discussion of the compositional patterns of comparable Old Babylonian legal records, see Dombradi, Darstellung (above n. 4), 33–160. For a convenient anthology of cuneiform lawsuit records from all periods, see F. Joannès (ed.), Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie: Archives judiciaires du Proche-Orient ancient (IIIe–Ier millénaires avant J.-C.), Saint-Denis 2000.

14 For earlier literature on this text see C. Wunsch, Und die Richter berieten…: Streitfälle in Babylon aus der Zeit Neriglissars und Nabonids, AfO 44/45, 1997/1998, (59–100), 96. Also see B. Wells, Testimony (above n. 11), 180–182 and idem, What is Biblical Law?: A Look at Pentateuchal Rules and Near Eastern Practice, CBQ 70, 2008, (223–243), 240–241.

15 For discussion of these procedures, see Holtz, Court Procedure (above n. 4), 223–253.

16 CAD kânu A4a (K, 168–169).

17 S. Dalley, A Catalogue of the Akkadian Cuneiform Tablets in the Collections of the Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh, With Copies of Texts, Royal Scottish Museum Art and Archaeology 2, Edinburgh 1979, No. 69: 24–26.

18 See Holtz, Court Procedure (above n. 4), 241–242. For the contrast with modern systems, where judges, rather than witnesses, perform this role, see R. Westbrook, Review of Dombradi, Darstellung (above n. 4), Or. 68, 1999, (122–127), 123.

19 Although the “narrative” of the decision records often begins with the plaintiffs' speeches, several texts (as well as simple logic) indicate that there have been prior, informal confrontations between the litigants. See Holtz, Court Procedure (above n. 4), 38–40; 224–232 and F. R. Magdalene / B. Wells / C. Wunsch, Pre-Trial Negotiations: The Case of the Runaway Slave in Dar 53, Iraq 70, 2008, 205–213. The existence of these pre-trial confrontations underscores the interpretation of the qabÛ-procedure as the formal opening of the actual trial.

20 The texts suggest as much, since the šemÛ-clause refers to “their arguments” (dibbīšunu) even though only the plaintiffs are usually quoted. This grammatical point indicates that all the arguments, including the defendants', are heard (Holtz, Court Procedure [above n. 4], 244).

21 For the identification of the law's apodosis at this point, see the discussion below.

22 Most English translations use the word “it”, referring to the entire affair, as the subject of the verb. However, the subject of all the previous verbs in the law (vv. 2 and 3) is the “man” of v. 2. Furthermore, in Jer 20:10 an active form of the verb n-g-d takes a direct object. Dtn 17:4 is, according to the translation above, simply the passive equivalent: the object of the active construction is the subject of the passive form.

23 See Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice (above n. 2), 248–253 for discussion of these terms and others that refer to the result of the inquiry.

24 Wells, Testimony (above n. 11), 102–103 and idem, The Cultic Versus the Forensic: Judahite and Mesopotamian Judicial Procedures in the First Millennium B.C.E., JAOS 128, 2005, (205–232), 222–223. Also See B. M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation, New York 1997, 118; E. Otto, Aspects of Legal Reformulations in Ancient Cuneiform and Israelite Law, in: B. M. Levinson (ed.), Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, JSOT.S 181, Sheffield 1994, (160–198), 193–194 and idem, Das Deuteronomium: Politische Theologie und Rechtsreform in Juda und Assyrien, BZAW 284, Berlin 1999, 88–89; 248–249.

25 B. Wells relies on the Neo-Babylonian legal corpus as the basis for a comparative legal argument that confirms and clarifies the significance of the Dtn 17:2–7 as procedural legislation, especially regarding the preferred means of evidence. See Wells, Testimony (above n. 11), 86–103 and Wells, Cultic Versus Forensic (above n. 24). Wells, however, does not introduce the comparative evidence in his interpretation of the verse's wording.

26 For description of the problem, in general, See Wells, Testimony (above n. 11), 91–92 and R. D. Kunjummen, The Syntax of Conditionals in Deuteronomy and Translation of wqatal (Consecutive Perfects) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Boston, 25 November, 2008), n.p. [cited 14 October, 2010], http://www.biblicallaw.net/2008/kunjummen.pdf. A survey of the placement of the conjunction “then” in English translations of Dtn 17:3–5 sufficiently illustrates the difficulty: JPS and NJPS place it at the beginning of 17:4b, which describes the inquiry; KJV and NRSV place it at the beginning of 17:5, which describes the execution (also See Kunjummen, Syntax); Wells places it before the verb “you shall hear” (Wells, Testimony [above n. 11], 86; Wells, Cultic Versus Forensic [above n. 24], 222). He writes that “with [the word wĕšāmāʿtā] the apodosis begins, and the first instruction is given: reports of apostasy are to be heard as formal court testimony” (Wells, Testimony [above n. 11], 93).

27 This interpretation emerges directly from the Masoretic verse division: 17:2–3 contain the protasis and 17:4 contains the beginning of the apodosis. Furthermore, since the verbal phrase wĕhuggad-lĕkā contains the 2ms dative lĕkā, the switch back to second person, usually a marker of the apodosis, occurs here (See Wells, Testimony [above n. 11], 92–93, with literature cited there. Note that Wells does not take this 2ms dative into consideration). In making his argument for placing the apodosis at the word wĕšāmāʿtā, Wells also cites the evidence of Dtn 13:13–19, a similar law in which “the apodosis begins with the commencement of judicial proceedings and investigation”, i.e., in Dtn 13:15 (Wells, Testimony [above n. 11], 93). The suggestion offered above does not contradict this possibility; it simply suggests that the description of the procedure begins with the report, rather than with the hearing. Note, however, that the sequence of verbs denoting investigation in Dtn 13:15 does not include the verb š-m-ʾ. In fact, the verb (in conjunction with the word lēʾmōr) occurs only at the beginning of Dtn 13:13, and without a verb of speech that marks a formal report comparable to wěhuggad-lěkā in Dtn 17:4. The implications of this difference and, especially, the mandated report in Dtn 17:4, require further study. For now, it is sufficient to note that the “hearing” in Dtn 13:13 seems to be less formal than the “hearing” in 17:4. For detailed analysis of other differences between the laws, See Levinson, Deuteronomy and Hermeneutics (above n. 24), 98–137. Kunjummen, for his part, implies that the apodosis begins at 17:5, apparently based on the presence of the wěhinnê clause, which “function[s] to report or present observations” as in Dtn 9:13, 16 and Dtn 22:17 (Kunjummen, Syntax [above n. 26]). This may indeed be the function of the wěhinnê clause, but this does not explain why it must be part of the protasis rather than the apodosis. Note that in Dtn 9:13 and 9:16 the wěhinnê clause follows the verb r-ʾ-y, comparable to the verbs for investigation in the laws.

28 See B. S. Jackson, Reflections on Biblical Criminal Law, JJS 24 (1973), (8–38), 33.

29 Wells, Cultic Versus Forensic (above n. 24), 223.

30 U. Rüterswörden, TDOT 8, 271. See also J. H. Tigay, Deuteronomy, The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia 1996, 134; 368 n. 41; D. L. Christensen, Deuteronomy 1:1–21:9, Revised, Word Biblical Commentary, Nashville 2001, 369; M. E. Biddle, Deuteronomy, Macon, Ga. 2003, 283–284.

31 In biblical studies, the most famous study is probably B. Gemser, The Rîb- or Controversy-Pattern in Hebrew Mentality, in: M. Noth / D. W. Thomas (eds.), Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East, VT.S 3, Leiden 1969, 120–137. For more recent overviews of this subject and important earlier literature on the Hebrew Bible as well as on Mesopotamian literature, See Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness (above n. 2), 13–25 and J. Y. Jindo, Biblical Metaphor Reconsidered: A Cognitive Approach to Poetic Prophecy in Jeremiah 1–24, HSM 64, Winona Lake, Ind. 2010, 75–133.

32 For discussion of the problems of identifying the speaker here and in the entire passage, see W. L. Holladay, Jeremiah 1: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah Chapters 1–25, Hermeneia, Philadelphia 1986, 276–277; P. Craigie / P. H. Kelley / J. F. Drinkard, Jr., Jeremiah 1–25, Word Biblical Commentary 26, Dallas 1991, 132; and G. Fischer, Jeremia 1–25, Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament, Freiburg 2005, 333. For the identification of God as speaker, See Holladay, Jeremiah, 277–279 and Craigie, Kelley and Drinkard, Jeremiah, 132 (with references to earlier literature in both commentaries), as well as D. H. Bak, Klagender Gott – klagende Menschen: Studien zur Klage im Jeremiabuch, BZAW 193, Berlin, 1990, 169.

33 For discussion and rejection of the possibility that ken means “thus”, rather than “truth”, See Holladay, Jeremiah (above n. 32), 279.

34 Note that in Jer 8:6 the phrase lôʾ-kēn yĕdabbērÛ is the only reference to an audible utterance. The remainder of the verse describes what should have been said, but, to God's disappointment, was not.

35 One consequence of this interpretation is that Jer 8–9 follow what Jindo identifies as the “general script of the destruction model”, which has, “three main stages or scenes: (1) JUDICIAL DECISION/ LAWSUIT; (2) DESTRUCTION/ WARFARE; (3) LAMENTATION/ AFTERMATH” (Jindo, Biblical Metaphor [above n. 31], 78). Jindo identifies this model as part of the “global metaphor” that is a key to understanding the coherence of Jer 1–24 (Jindo, Biblical Metaphor [above n. 31], 71–147). Further research should explore how individual prophecies might function as microcosms of the global metaphor.

36 The use of ḥ-q-r brings Job 5:27 even closer, in terms of phrasing, to Dtn 13:15, which describes an investigative process very similar to the one in Dtn 17:4. See A. Ḥakham, Sēper ʾIyyob, Jerusalem 1970, 45 (Hebrew).

37 Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness (above n. 2), 206.

38 See Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness (above n. 2), 199; 212. For the overall interpretation of the dialogue between Job and his friends as reflections of preliminaries to the trial itself, See Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness (above n. 2), 190–246.

39 For discussion, See E. Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job, trans. H. Knight, London 1967, 73–74.

40 According to N. Habel, the verb is indeed a technical term but belongs to the vocabulary of wisdom, rather than the lawcourt (N. Habel, The Book of Job: A Commentary, OTL, Philadelphia 1985, 137. Habel's interpretation is especially noteworthy, given his tendency elsewhere to “maximize the legal connotations of the Hebrew text” [Newsom, Book of Job (above n. 10), 150]). For studies of the semantic range of the verb, see J. K. Aitken, Lexical Semantics and the Cultural Context of Knowledge in Job 28, Illustrated by the Meaning of ḥāqar, in: E. Van Wolde (ed.), Job 28: Cognition in Context, Leiden 2003, 119–137 and P. J. P. Van Hecke, Searching for and Exploring Wisdom: A Cognitive-Semantic Approach to the Hebrew Verb ḥāqar in Job 28, in the same volume, 139–162. Aitken assigns the meaning “to examine an idea for its worth” to the usage of the verb in Job 5:27, which is separate from “to examine a charge to determine it validity” (Aitken, Lexical Semantics, 130). Professor A. Koller's assistance with the reference to this volume is gratefully acknowledged.