1 See, e.g., R. R. Hutton, The Case of the Blasphemer Revisited (Lev xxiv 10–23), VT 49, 1999, 532–541; S. Tishchenko, To Curse God? Some Remarks on Jacob Milgrom's Interpretation of Lev 24:10–16, 23, BabBib 3, 2006, 545–550; S. T. Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23 in Light of H's Concept of Holiness, in S. Shectman & J. Baden eds, The Strata of the Priestly Writings. Contemporary Debate and Future Directions, AThANT 95, Zürich, 2009, 73–86. The nature of the offence recounted in v. 10–16 was already the subject of a number of earlier studies. In addition to the main commentaries, see especially J. Weingreen, The Case of the Blasphemer, VT 22, 1972, 118–123; H. S. Schult, Lev 24,15b und 16a, DBAT 7, 1974, 31–32; J. B. Gabel & C. B. Wheeler, The Redactor's Hand in the Blasphemy Pericope of Leviticus XXIV, VT 30, 1980, 227–229; D. H. Livingston, The Crime of Leviticus XXIV 11, VT 36, 1986, 352–354.

2 See especially L. Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Auge um Auge, Zahn um Zahn, BiLi 63, 1990, 163–175, here 169–171; E. Otto, Die Geschichte der Talion im Alten Orient und Israel, in D. R. Daniels, U. Glessmer & M. Rösel eds, Ernten, was man sät. FS K. Koch, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1991,101–130, here 126–127; B. S. Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law, JSOTSup 314, Sheffield, 2000, 269–280; O. Artus, art. Talion, DBSup 13, 2005, 881–908 (this article, written in French, is probably the best synthesis available at the present on talion in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East).

3 In particular, many authors have sought to identify a chiastic structure of sorts in Lev 24,10–23,: see especially J. W. Welch, Chiasmus in Biblical Law, in B. Jackson ed., The Boston Conference Volume, JLSA 4, Atlanta, 1990, 5–22; more recently, compare for instance T. M. Willis, Blasphemy, Talion, and Chiasmus: The Marriage of Form and Content in Lev 24:13–23, Bib 90, 2009, 68–74. Other authors have addressed, in various ways, the problem of the relationship of Lev 24,10–23, to its literary context in H; see, e.g., R. R. Hutton, Narrative in Leviticus: The Case of the Blaspheming Son (Lev 24,10–23), ZAR 3, 1997, 145–163; J. R. Master, The Place of Chapter 24 in the Structure of the Book of Leviticus, BS 159, 2002, 421; and most recently, L. M. Trevaskis, The Purpose of Leviticus 24 within its Literary Context, VT 59, 2009, 295–312.

4 As some scholars have pointed out (e.g., Baruch Schwartz), the expression “Holiness legislation” should be preferred because, contrary to the usual expression “Holiness Code”, it does not imply that this material ever comprised a separate collection of laws as the Covenant Code or the Deuteronomic Code. The original subscription to that legislation is in Lev 26, 46; chap. 27 is clearly a later addition, as is generally acknowledged.

5 For this general structure, compare especially V. Wagner, Zur Existenz des sogenannten “Heiligkeitsgesetzes”, ZAW 86, 1974, 307–316, here 314–315; further E. Otto, Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments, ThW 3,2, Stuttgart et al., 1994, 242; A. Ruwe, “Heiligkeitsgesetz” und “Priesterschrift”: literaturgeschichtliche und rechtssystematische Untersuchungen zu Levitikus 17–26, FAT 26, Tübingen, 1999, 297ff. Ruwe convincingly shows that the calendar of Lev 23 is already informed by a Sabbatical comput, like the prescription for the seventh year and the jubilee.

6 For a discussion of that passage, see, e.g., C. Nihan, From priestly Torah to Pentateuch: A Study in the Composition of Leviticus, FAT 2/25, Tübingen, 2007, 511–512.

7 On this group of texts in the Torah, see especially M. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel, Oxford, 1985, 99ff.; also, F. Crüsemann, Die Tora. Theologie und Sozialgeschichte des alttestamentlichen Gesetzes, München, 1992, 120–126. While the language of some of the Numbers passages shows similarities with H's language, they are too different to be simply assigned to “H”. More likely, these Numbers passages are part of a later, post-H redaction. See especially R. Achenbach, Die Vollendung der Tora. Studien zur Redaktionsgeschichte des Numeribuches im Kontext von Hexateuch und Pentateuch, BZAR 3, Wiesbaden, 2003, 443ff. Note, moreover, that some features in the formulation of Lev 24,10–23, are not typical of H either. For instance, the commission formula in v. 15a, weʾel benê yiśrāʾēl tedabbēr lēʾmor, has no parallel in H but is reminiscent of Num 27,1–11, (see 27,8). Otherwise, it also occurs in Ex 30,31 and Lev 9,3.

8 Among classical commentators of Leviticus, compare, e.g., K. Elliger, Leviticus, HAT I/4, Tübingen, 1966, 329–333; M. Noth, Leviticus. A Commentary, OTL, Philadelphia, 1965, 180. In addition to earlier commentators, compare, e.g., K. Grünwaldt, Das Heiligkeitsgesetz Leviticus 17–26. Ursprüngliche Gestalt, Tradition und Theologie, BZAW 271, Berlin/New York, 1999, 92ff.; Ruwe, “Heiligkeitsgesetz”, 56–57 and 70–71. Otherwise, several recent analyses of Lev 24,10–23, tend to acknowledge the literary unity of that passage, although the classical arguments for dissociating between “law” and “narrative” in this text are seldom discussed in detail. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3B, New York et al., 2001, 2105, concludes that, “the law and the narrative share a simultaneous origin” and that they were “inextricably woven into each other not just in the present text introverted structure of the text, but also from the beginning”. For his part, Hutton, Narrative in Leviticus, 151–153, concludes that the “legal collection” (including either v. 15b–22 or merely 17–21) may be earlier than the narrative, but that even so “there is much more continuity between the narrative and the legal material which it encompasses than is generally allowed” (153).

9 Note, also, that the emphasis of v. 16b on the fact that the law is valid not only for the native but also for the resident alien (gēr) makes good sense with respect to the narrative in v. 10–14, since the blasphemer is presented as having an Israelite mother and an Egyptian father. See further below.

10 For a detailed discussion of this question, see now R. Achenbach, Das Heiligkeitsgesetz und die sakralen Ordnungen des Numeribuches im Horizont der Pentateuchredaktion, in T. Römer ed., The Books of Leviticus and Numbers, BETL 215, Leuven et al., 2008, 145–175, here 172–174. Achenbach makes a fine point of showing that not only the structure, but also the language of Lev 24,10–16, (and 23) are reminiscent of the episode in Num 15,32–36,.

11 The attempt to isolate an earlier “legal” core in v. 15–22 was entirely predicated on the observation – in itself correct – that the account in 24,10–14, contains many features distinctive of “P”. See, e.g., the discussion by A. Cholewiński, Heiligkeitsgesetz und Deuteronomium. Eine vergleichende Studie, AnBib 66, Rome, 1976, 97–98. However, this was an issue only as long as it was assumed that H was earlier than P. Once it is accepted that H is in fact post-P, and not pre-P, the attempt to eliminate the account in v. 10–14 by redaction-critical means may be safely abandoned. Note, interestingly, that Cholewiński and other scholars had to admit that the elimination of v. 10–14 was uneasy, and that it was probably no longer possible to reconstruct the original legislation behind Lev 24,10–23, (Ibid., 98).

12 This solution is argued, e.g., by Hutton, Narrative in Leviticus, 152–153, who considers that v. 17–21 formed an “originally independent collection” (153), which was then inserted in its present context by the author of the narrative in v. 10–23. However, Hutton's view is largely based on the observation that a chiastic structure is more evident in v. 17–21 than in v. 15b–22 (152). I concur with him about this observation (see further below, § 4), but I do not think that it offers a sound basis for identifying redactional activity in these verses. Others have surmised that the laws on blasphemy and on talion have their origin in two separate collections, and were then brought together by the author of Lev 24,10–23,: e.g., E. S. Gerstenberger, Leviticus: A Commentary, OTL, Louisville, Ky, 1996, 362–365.

13 Even among earlier commentators who favored the view that the “narrative” portions of Lev 24,10–23, did not belong to the same layer as the “legal” material (see above), a majority correctly acknowledged that v. 15b–22 formed a literary unit. Compare, e.g., Elliger, Leviticus, 332–333.

14 Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 292–293. As far as I am aware, this important observation has received little attention so far in the studies dealing with Lev 24,10–23,.

15 On Lev 24,10–23, as réécriture of Ex 21,22–25, (together with other passages of the Covenant Code), see below, § 4. This notion is already implied by Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 292–293, when he writes: “In short, the Levitical passage gains immensely in coherence if we view it as a literary reworking of themes from the Covenant Code” (293). Although I regard Jackson's interpretation of Lev 24,10–23, as a significant contribution to the study of this passage, my own reading differs in several respects. Above all, Jackson does not really address the question of the significance of joining together blasphemy and murder in the law of Lev 24, which is the central issue of the present study.

16 This rendering of qll P in Lev 24,11a and 15b is found in several commentaries. See, e.g., B. A. Levine, Leviticus, JPS.TC, Philadelphia/New York, 1989, 166; J. E. Hartley, Leviticus, WBC 4, Dallas, Tx, 1992, 409; E. Gerstenberger, Leviticus. A Commentary, OTL, Louisville, Ky, 1996, 362; most recently J. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2081–2082. For a comprehensive criticism of Milgrom's translation, see now Tishchenko, To Curse. Other commentators apparently hesitate, and leave both options open; compare, e.g., F. Gorman, Divine Presence and Community. A Commentary on the Book of Leviticus, ITC, Grand Rapids/Edinburgh, 1997, 134.

17 For a convenient survey, see J. Scharbert, art. qll, TDOT 13, Grand Rapids, Mi, 2004, 37–44, here 38–39, as well as the recent discussion by Tishchenko, To Curse. In Akkadian, the root qalālu (I) in the G stem likewise means “to be, become light, weak, slight”, and in the D stem (qullulu) “to despise, humiliate, dishonor” when used of a person; see CAD, s.v. qalālu, 55–58.

18 Compare, e.g., Weingreen, Case, 120–121; Scharbert, art. qll, 39; Hutton, Case, 538–539; most recently Tishchenko, To Curse, and Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23, 77–79.

19 As noted, in particular, by Tishchenko, To Curse, 546–547. A further argument added by Tishchenko and others is that the very notion that human beings could “curse” Yahweh would be entirely unlikely, because “strictly speaking, the God of Israel is behind every curse as its supreme executor” (Tishchenko, To Curse, 545). However, this view does not really account for passages such as Job 1,5 and 2,9, where the possibility for human beings to curse the deity is explicitly acknowledged (though in these two passages the verb brk, “to bless”, is used as a euphemism for “to curse”).

20 See Num 1,17; Ezr 8,20; 1 Chr 12,32; 16,41; 2 Chr 28,15; 31,19, and on this J. Scharbert, art. nqb, TDOT 9, Grand Rapids, Mi, 1998, 551–553, here 552. Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2108, also calls attention to the parallel with the expression in Nabatean nqwbyn bšmhn.

21 Alternatively, it has been suggested that the form wayyiqqob in v. 11a was related to the root qbb, whose basic meaning is “to curse”. In this case, the form wayyiqqob would be an example of an Aramaic imperfect doubling (see GKC § 67g; J. E. Hartley, Leviticus, WBC 4, Dallas, Tx, 1992, 404). However, this view is unlikely. First, it forces us to assume that the two forms used in 24,11a and 15b–16a are distinct, despite the obvious parallel that is suggested between these two passages. Furthermore, as observed by Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2108, the root qbb never occurs with the object šēm, “name”.

22 Scharbert, art. nqb, 552. This rendering of nqb in the context of Lev 24 is favored in several recent analyses; compare R. Schmitt, Magie im Alten Testament, AOAT 313, Münster, 2004, 124; Tishchenko, To Curse, 548; as well as Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23, 79–80. Kamionkowski, in particular, bases a good deal of her interpretation of Lev 24,10–23, on this rendering of nqb. Thus, she concludes that nqb “is neither a simple utterance of the Name nor a curse, but rather some sort of penetration into the divine-human nexus akin to an unwelcome entry into the Holy of Holies” (80). In my view, the negative connotation of nqb in the context of Lev 24,10–23, is likely, especially in the light of the fact that it is used alone in 24,16aa (see below). Still, I would hesitate to place too much emphasis on that reading for the interpretation of Lev 24,10–23, as Kamionkowski effectively tends to do.

23 The proposal that Lev 24,10–23, was the first evidence for the complete interdiction of uttering Yahweh's name has been advanced by a few earlier commentators, such as Gabel & Wheeler, Redactor's Hand. However, this does not account for the fact that in 24,11a the verb nqb is combined with qll, whose derogatory meaning is evident. For this reason, Livingston, Leviticus XXIV 11, suggested that the formulation of v. 11 shows that the offender had cursed Yahweh simply by using Yahweh's own name; yet this interpretation seems far-fetched. As a matter of fact, if the author of Lev 24,10–23, merely wanted to ban Yahweh's name, he would not have needed such a sophisticated narrative. Instead, the notion of contempt clearly seems to be part of the narrative context. In the course of a quarrel, the divine name is hardly expected to be pronounced respectfully, and this point is made clear by the combination of nqb and qll in v. 11a.

24 See, e.g., Schmitt, Magie, 124, followed by Tishchenko, To Curse, 548–549.

25 E.g., Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23, 79–80. A different view is held by Hutton, Case, esp. 538–539, who considers that the verbs nqb and qll consistently refer to a single action in Lev 24. Hutton is certainly correct as regards v. 11a (see below). However, his view is untenable as regards v. 15b and 16a, where the two verbs are clearly used in different contexts. Thus, Hutton is forced to presume not only that v. 15b and 16a refer to similar offenses (which is incorrect, see below), but that the sanctions prescribed in these two passages are actually identical, which openly contradicts the text of Lev 24,15b–16a where a distinction is made on the contrary between the bearing of one's sin (15b) and the penalty of death (16a).

26 For the first view, see, e.g., Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2108 (“the object YHWH is understood”). For the second view, see, e.g., H. C. Brichto, The Problem of “Curse” in the Hebrew Bible, SBLMS 16, Philadelphia, 146.

27 For this interpretation, see, e.g., Livingston, Crime, 353; Levine, Leviticus, 166; Hartley, Leviticus, 409; most recently Tishchenko, To Curse, 544–545.

28 Obviously, haššēm in v. 11a is a designation for the name of Yahweh himself. This is confirmed by the parallel with v. 16a, which reads šēm-yhwh.

29 The problem of the exact meaning of this form of punishment (which occurs several times in the priestly legal traditions of the Pentateuch) cannot be discussed in the limits of this essay. B. J. Schwartz, The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature, in D. P. Wright et al. eds, Pomegranates and Golden Bells. Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom, Winona Lake, In, 1995, 3–21, has convincingly established that it does not indicate a particular kind of punishment. Schwartz also holds that this expression does not even refer to punishment, but rather is a “metaphor for guilt”. I find this view less compelling. The likelihood that this expression does refer to a form of punishment is supported in particular by the use of a similar expression in Neo-Babylonian legal documents. On this issue, see especially the fine analysis by B. Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes, BZAR 4, Wiesbaden, 2004, 73–78. Wells demonstrates that in Neo-Babylonian legal documents the bearing of sin refers to a person's failure to comply with the legal or administrative officials or with a duty owed to such officials. He concludes that, “To bear sin seems to indicate that a person is guilty and subject whatever punishment the court or administrative board deems necessary” (78). The majority of passages mentioning the bearing of sin can be interpreted as referring to a punishment enacted in the future by Yahweh rather than a human jurisdiction. However, contrary to what is sometimes affirmed, this punishment is not necessarily irremediable; the opposite is implied by the law of Lev 5,1–6, (cf. v. 1, and the provision in v. 5–6).

30 For this view, see, e.g., Schult, Lev 24,15; Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 101; Hartley, Leviticus, 406; as well as J. Joosten, People and Land in the Holiness Code, Leiden, 1996, 69. Other authors explicitly deny this possibility, and consider that the phrase “his god” must refer to Yahweh exclusively; cf. Gerstenberger, Leviticus, 362; Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2115, and most recently Willis, Blasphemy, 71. However, these authors are usually unable to explain the presence of the suffixed pronoun third masculine singular in the form (ʾaelohāyw). Note, interestingly, that the LXX reads θηόν, without the suffix, which may suggest that the Greek translator of Lev 24 was already embarrassed by the phrase “his god” preserved in the MT. This interpretation is entirely consistent with the general perspective of the Holiness legislation. For H, exclusive worship of Yahweh is mandatory for the sole Israelites because it is one of the distinctive marks of their consecration to him (e.g., Lev 19,4a). For non-Israelites, worship of other deities is permitted, but not the offering of sacrifices to them. Accordingly, only the law of Lev 17,8–9, prescribing that all sacrifices must be made to Yahweh is mandatory for the resident alien; the law of 17,3–7, prescribing that all animals slaughtered must be offered as sacrifices to Yahweh is mandatory for the Israelites, but not for resident aliens who are not mentioned in these verses, contrary to 17,8–9,.

31 Thus, against Schmitt, Tishchenko and others, it is not possible to state that nqb and qll in Lev 24,10–23, are merely equivalent; yet against Kamionkowski, it is also not the case that qll is necessarily a less serious offense than nqb. Disrespecting Yahweh may imply the abusive utterance of his name, as in the case of the son of the Israelite woman related in v. 11a, although it does not have to.

32 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 101.

33 See, e.g., D. Wright, art. rgm, TDOT 13, Grand Rapids, 2004, 324–326, here 325. The fact that the witnesses (“all those who have heard”) must lay both hands upon the culprit (v. 14) probably serves to designate the blasphemer as guilty of the crime and worthy of death, as argued by Wright and others. Whether or not the hand-leaning rite has a further possible function, especially in the light of the analogy with the hand-leaning rite in Lev 16,21, is disputed. According to Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2113, this gesture also serves a transference function, namely, “to convey the pollution generated by the blasphemy back to its producer”. Although, admittedly, the text does not explicitly state that blaspheming the divine name induces pollution of the sanctuary, the two issues are nevertheless paralleled in Lev 20,3.

34 For this insightful suggestion, see Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2110.

35 The information about the blasphemer's genealogy in v. 11b is often viewed by commentators as a later addition to the narrative of Lev 24,10–23,. In my view, this conclusion, while possible, is not necessary.

36 This point is also rightly noted by Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23, esp. 83. The classical view that the divine name would be an hypostasis of the divine presence in the dtr literature has been challenged by S. L. Richter, The Deuteronomistic History and the Name Theology: lešakkēn šemô šām in the Bible and the Ancient Near East, BZAW 318, Berlin – New York, 2002. Developping an idea that had already been advanced by some earlier scholars (such as R. de Vaux, Le lieu que Yahvé a choisi pour y établir son nom, in F. Maass ed., Das ferne und nahe Wort. Festschrift L. Rost, BZAW 105, Berlin, 1967, 219–228), Richter basically argues that the dtr formula lešakkēn šemô šām is not related to the D-stem of West Semitic škn, “to cause to be dwelling”, but is a loan adaptation from Akkadian šumu šakānu, itself related the G-stem škn in East Semitic meaning “to put”. Consequently, the formula in the dtr literature does not refer to the name as a divine hypostasis of sorts, but is a juridical claim to possession. Kamionkowski (Leviticus 24,10–23, 83–84), refers to Richter's views, and concludes that, if she is correct, “it may be that the Holiness Code writers were the only school of ancient Israel to use the concept of the Name of God to develop a theological stance”. In my opinion, Richter may well be correct in some instances, but not all the occurrences of this or a similar formula within the dtr literature can be interpreted as juridical claims to possession. This is already obvious in the first occurrence of this formula, Deut 12,5, where the consonantal text preserved by MT reads: לשום את־שמו שם לשכנו. The Massoretic tradition has vocalized the consonants lšknw as lešiknô, thus apparently interpreting it as a substantive form, “for his dwelling (?)”. In addition, it has linked this phrase with the second half of the verse by placing an atnaḥ after לשום את־שמו שם. However, it is generally acknowledged that the reading implied by MT's vocalization is unlikely. More probably, lšknw should be vocalized לשכנו, and should be viewed as an apposition to לשום את־שמו שם that specifies the meaning of the previous sentence: namely, “in order to make it dwell” (compare, e.g., E. Nielsen, Deuteronomium, HAT 6, Tübingen, 1995, 132). If so, the interpretation of the divine name as a hypostasis is already apparent in the first occurrence of this formula in the dtr literature. Other passages in which the formula occurs, especially in Kings, support this interpretation and show that the formula cannot be explained simply as claim to possession; compare especially 1 Kgs 8,16–29,; and further 2 Kgs 23,27 (cf. also 2 Chr 6,5, 6; 7,16; 33,4). Even Richter must admit, in the case of 1 Kgs 8, that in this central dtr text the formula “may have something to do with the divine presence” (Richter, The Deuteronomistic History and Name Theology, 215–217). Curiously, Richter also fails to discuss the traditional observation that the same reticence about the traditional conceptions of the divine presence in Israel can be observed at several other places in Dtr literature, e.g., in the representation of the Ark as a mere box for the tablets, and no longer as the deity's footstool (Deut 10,1–5,; 1 Kgs 8, 9, 21), or of Yahweh as sitting enthroned (with yšb) in heaven and not on earth (1 Kgs 8,27.30.39.43.49). Finally, as T.N.D. Mettinger and others have shown, the use of divine names as hypostases of a deity is also attested elsewhere in the ANE. All in all, therefore, the attempt to derive the phrase lešakkēn šemô šām entirely from the Mesopotamian monumental tradition is not successful in my opinion, and the traditional view that this phrase also implies some sort of reconceptualization of the nature of the divine presence in the temple cannot be eliminated so easily. Accordingly, the presentation of the divine name in Lev 24 is not a unicum, but stands on the contrary in the continuation of the dtr tradition.

37 This point has correctly been observed by several commentators. See, e.g., B. A. Levine, Leviticus, JPSTC, New York, 1989, 167, who argues that the common punishment connects v. 16 and 17.

38 That v. 17–21 are arranged in chiastic order has long been observed; among recent commentators, see, among others, Hutton, Narrative in Leviticus, 152. Others have suggested to extend the chiasm to include all of v. 13–23 or even 10–23. Cf. Welch, Chiasmus in Biblical Law, 7–9; and similarly Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2128–2130; D. Luciani, Sainteté et pardon. Vol. 1: Structure littéraire du Lévitique, BETL 185, Leuven, 2005, 170–176; most recently Willis, Blasphemy, Talion and Chiasmus. In my view, however, there is one general issue with this latter analysis. I agree that it is possible to identify some parallels beyond v. 17–21. But such parallels are much more vague, and it cannot be disputed, in my opinion, that the chiastic arrangement is more obvious in the case of v. 17–21 that in the case of 13–23 or 10–23 as a whole. To take one recent example, some of the parallels identified by Willis do not seem very obvious, or even appear somewhat far-fetched. For instance, Willis identifies a parallel between v. 22b (“For I am Yahweh your God”) and v. 15b (“When a man curses his God shall bear his sin”); likewise he is forced to draw a parallel between v. 16 as a whole and v. 22a, although only the second part of v. 16 (16b) is equivalent with v. 22a, whereas the first (and much longer) part of the verse falls out of the structure. Again, the point is not to dismiss entirely the observation that parallels are not restricted to v. 17–21 and can also be identified in the rest of the story. Rounding off a story by returning to the main motifs that were introduced at the beginning is a classical narrative technique, which can be found at other places in the Hebrew Bible. Yet this does not mean that the whole story has to be construed as a chiasm, contrary to what is evidently the case for v. 17–21. For recent criticism of the view that Lev 24,10–23, as a whole is structured chiastically, see also Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23, as well as the fine remarks by S. Chavel in Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2140–2145.

39 The Greek tradition (= G) has preserved some interesting variations in these verses, the meaning of which is discussed in the following analysis.

40 Within the Hebrew Bible, this expression is exclusively found in traditions that originated in priestly circles: compare Gen 9,5; Num 9,6.7; 19,11.13; 31,35.40.46; Ez 27,13; 1 Chr 5,21. For the meaning of the use of this expression in the context of Lev 24, see further below, § 5.

41 See, e.g., Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Leviticus, SCS 44, Atlanta, Ga, 1997, 397. Wevers notes that in Origen's Hexapla (hex), the plus in G is marked with an obelus. It is possible that the reason why G does not render the Hebrew term kol (although the Greek equivalent is added in hex) is because this term is missing in Ex 21,12 as well.

42 In the priestly texts of the Pentateuch, behēmāh usually refers to domestic animals specifically: compare, e.g., the enumeration in Gen 1,24–25, where behēmāh means four-footed domestic animals and is distinct from ḥayyat hāʾāreṣ, which refers to the wild (land) animals. On the use of behēmāh in P, see further, e.g., W. Houston, Purity and Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law, JSOTSup 140, Sheffield, 1993, 33–34. This meaning fits well the context of Lev 24,18. The compensation stipulated in this verse (whether in kind or in money, see the following note) does not make sense in the case of a wild animal, and evidently presupposes a situation in which the animal killed was the property of another Israelite.

43 This point is not entirely clear. The following verses (19–20) clearly imply a literal understanding of talion in the case of human beings (see below). Since v. 18 already used the formula nepeš taḥat nepeš which, in Ex 21,22–25, is the key formula for talion, it could be argued that the same meaning applies here: i.e., in exchange of an animal's life, another animal must be given. However, this observation must be balanced with another observation, namely the fact that the verb used in v. 18 immediately before the nepeš taḥat nepeš formula, šlm Piel, is already used as a technical term for restitution in the Covenant Code, where it can equally refer to restitution in kind (Ex 21,36) and in money (Ex 21,34). Since the use of šlm Piel in Lev 24,18 is clearly taken from the Covenant Code, it is possible to assume that both possibilities are likewise implied here.

44 The first part of the verse is missing in the Greek tradition. This may be due to homoioarcton (from Ûmakkeh to Ûmakkeh).

45 In the priestly literature, ʾādam always refers to human beings in general, whereas the gender distinction is expressed by the words ʾîš and ʾîššāh respectively.

46 In the Pentateuch, the term šeber I (“fracture”, to be distinguished from šeber II, “grain, corn”) is exclusively found in these two passages. Also, in both instances it is combined with the term mÛm “infirmity”. Thus, the assumption that its use in Lev 24,20 creates a link with 21,19, as assumed by several recent commentators, is probably correct. How such connection is to be interpreted is, however, another question. Otto, Geschichte der Talion, 126–127, correctly observes that šeber in Lev 21 occurs in the context of a list of blemishes (v. 18–20) excluding a member of Aaron's family from officiating as a priest. He concludes that the main issue in Lev 24,20a is likewise the fact that injuries inflicted to a person would exclude that person from participation to the cult. Consequently, the function of v. 19–20 would be to emphasize the extreme gravity of injuries excluding someone from the cult. A similar view has been adopted by some recent authors. Grünwaldt, Heiligkeitsgesetz, 306–307, considers that the fact that the talion formula in v. 20a is framed by v. 19 and 20b means that anyone inflicting an injury that is susceptible to exclude a person from the cult should likewise be excluded from the cultic community; compare also the similar comment by Artus, Talion, 904. However, I do not find this interpretation compelling. In my view, the whole idea that Lev 24,19–20, deals with exclusion from the cult has no basis in the text, and the context of Lev 21,18–20, and 24,19–20, (or 24,17–21, as a whole) is quite distinct. For an alternative interpretation, see below, § 5.

47 See, e.g., R. Westbrook, Lex Talionis and Exodus 21,22–25, RB 93, 1986, 52–69; Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Auge um Auge, 101–106; Otto, Geschichte der Talion, esp. 124; Artus, Talion, 896–897. Close examination of the formulation of Ex 21,23–25, indicates that it is not meant in a literal sense. The use of the verb ntn in Ex 21,23b has a parallel in v. 22, where the same verb is precisely used for the payment of the damage (ʾāsôn, cf. Gen 42,4; 42,38 and 44,29) caused to the woman (presumably referring to the loss of her fetus). This is consistent with the observation of Schwienhorst-Schönberger that the verb ntn in the Covenant Code is always used for the payment of an indemnity in the case of a possession that cannot be replaced, which fits well with the injuries mentioned in v. 24–25. The particle taḥat is used several times in the Covenant Code for compensation in the case of damages to possessions, and this also applies to the situation addressed immediately after Ex 21,22–25, cf. 21,26–27,. Also, the expression ntn + x taḥat x in the Covenant Code is equivalent to Akkadian x kîma x + nadānum, which is used in the context of clauses dealing with financial indemnification (for this observation, see already H.W. Jüngling, Auge für Auge, Zahn für Zahn. Bemerkungen zu Sinn und Geltung der alttestamentlichen Talionsformeln, ThPh 59, 1984, 1–38, here 19). Finally, throughout the Covenant Code the only physical punishment that is ever considered is death for premeditated murder (Ex 21,12); other forms of penalty consisting of physical mutilation (as would be implied by a literal rendering of the talion in Ex 21,23b–25) are never considered.

48 Admittedly, the formulation emphasizing strict reciprocity in Lev 24,19b and 20b has an antecedent in the law about the false witness of Deut 19,15–21, cf. 19,19a. Furthermore, it is already combined there (although less strictly than in Lev 24,19–20,) with a restatement of the talion formula, cf. Deut 19,21. In this respect, it is possible to identify in Deut 19 the origins of the “literal” interpretation of talion (i.e., prohibiting financial compensation). However, in Deut 19 this interpretation is still restricted to a specific legal case (false testimony); whereas in Lev 24,17–21, it is now expanded to cover the whole realm of criminal law, including injuries made not only to humans but to animals as well.

49 I therefore disagree with some recent authors who, while correctly holding that the formulation of Ex 21,23b–25 refers not to physical mutilation but to a form of financial compensation, conclude that talion in Lev 24,17–21, should not be interpreted in a literal sense either. See, e.g., Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Auge um Auge, 169–171; Grünwaldt, Heiligkeitsgesetz, 306–308, more hesitatingly Artus, Talion, 905. Contrast, e.g., Westbrook, Lex Talionis, 68–69, who rightly concluded that talion had a different meaning in Lev 24,17–21, than in Ex 21,22–25, and had to be taken in a literal, non-compensatory sense. In particular, the authors interpreting talion in Lev 24 as having the same meaning as in Ex 21 cannot explain why the second part of the talion formula taken from Ex 21,24a (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) is now framed by two parallel statements emphasizing the literal application of this formula. The attempt by Grünwaldt to interpret the formulation of v. 19–20 as referring not to physical mutilation but to expulsion from the cult is not convincing, and has no basis in the text in my opinion; see the critique of this view above, note 46.

50 This means that the classical view according to which there is no concept of punishment implying a form of physical mutilation of the culprit in the traditions of the Hebrew Bible needs to be revised. It is probably correct in the case of the Covenant Code (see above, and note 47). But physical mutilation as a form of legal punishment is clearly attested once in Deuteronomy, Deut 25,11–12, in the case of a woman seizing the genitals of her husband's adversary in the context of a brawl. (Note, interestingly, that Deut 25,11–12, uses the same verb as Ex 21,22, nṣh Niphal, and is probably already a reapplication of this situation to another legal case.) According to the interpretation proposed here, physical mutilation is also implied in the revision of Ex 21,22–25, in Lev 24.

51 See B. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation, New York, 1997, 36–38 (in the case of Deut 12,20–28,) and passim. Levinson rightly concludes that the authors of Deuteronomy viewed the lemma “atomistically”, and comments: “legal and textual authority operates at the level of individual words that, even when recontextualized, retain their operative force” (46). The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to the revision of the talion formula of Ex 21 in Lev 24.

52 Whereas Ex 21,12 is continued in 21,13–14, by provisions for the case of non-premeditated homicide, this issue is not considered in Lev 24. However, it is the subject of a detailed legislation on “asylum cities” in Num 35,9–34, in the case of murders committed by inadvertence (bišgāgāh), which continues for its part the reinterpretation of Ex 21,13–14, in Deut 19,1–13,. On the basis of the interpretation offered here, the fact that the issue of intentionality is not addressed in Lev 24 is logical. Because the function of the restatement of Ex 21,12 in Lev 24,17 is to introduce and legitimate the general principle of strict, quantitative proportionality in the punishment of not only murder, but all cases of physical injury (v. 19–20), the qualification of this principle in the case of non-voluntary, inadvertent homicide would significantly weaken the whole legal argument established in Lev 24.

53 The beginning of Deut 25,11 is a verbatim repetition of the first words of Ex 21,22 (wekîyinnāṣÛ ʾanāšîm, “when two men are fighting”; Deut 25,11 adds “together”).

54 For this idea, see especially Jackson, Semiotics of Biblical Law, 292–293. Otherwise, in the Pentateuch the verb nṣh Niphal occurs only once, in Ex 2,23; besides, the context of this passage is entirely different from Ex 21,22; Deut 25,11 and Lev 24,10.

55 The necessity to consider Ex 21,22–25, not only in relation with v. 18–32 but within 21,12–32, as a whole, including the laws of v. 12–17, is rightly stressed by Otto, Geschichte der Talion, 128.

56 Cf. Ex 20,22. The content of the Covenant Code also makes clear that these rules are addressed to the paterfamilias, the head of the Israelite household. By contrast, in the Covenant Code, as also in Deuteronomy, the resident alien is consistently regarded as a dependent person, whose survival depends on his inclusion into an Israelite household (Ex 23,12) or on the charity of Israelite landowners.

57 In H, see Lev 17,8.10.12.13.15; 18,26; 19,10.33–34; 20,2; 22,18; 23,22; 24,16.22. Outside of H, cf. Ex 12,19.48–49; Lev 16,29; Num 9,14; 15,14–16,.26.29–30; 19,10; 35,15. All these passages outside of H show several stylistic and thematic connections with Lev 17–26.

58 See, among others, I. Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence. The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School, Minneapolis, 1995, 182; G. Barbiero, Der Fremde im Bundesbuch und im Heiligkeitgesetz: zwischen Absonderung und Annahme, in G. Barbiero, Studien zu alttestamentlichen Texten, SBAB.AT 34, Stuttgart, 2002, 221–254, here 252.

59 See the classical study by A. Bertholet, Die Stellung der Israeliten und der Juden zu den Fremden, Freiburg im Brisgau/Leipzig, 1896, 152–178. The view that the gēr, in H, has become a proselyte has been quite popular throughout the 20th century; compare, e.g., D. Kellermann, art. גור gÛr, TDOT 2 (1975) 439–449, here 446 (“the ger has largely become a proselyte”); H.-P. Mathys, Liebe deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst. Untersuchungen zum alttestamentlichen Gebot der Nächstenliebe (Lev 19, 18), OBO 71, Freiburg/Göttingen, 1990, 40–45; C. Bultmann, Der Fremde im antiken Juda: eine Untersuchung zum sozialen Typenbegriff “ger” und seinem Bedeutungswandel in der alttestamentlichen Gesetzgebung, FRLANT 153, Göttingen, 1992, 216–217. In a recent publication, Rainer Albertz concurs that the resident alien in H is not a proselyte, but considers that it is possible to identify in a late Priestly layer, which he terms “P4”, a move towards a fuller integration of resident aliens into the cultic community: see R. Albertz, From Aliens to Proselytes: Non-Priestly and Priestly Legislation Concerning Strangers, in R. Achenbach, R. Albertz and J. Wöhrle eds, The Foreigner and the Law: Perspectives from the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, BZAR 16, Wiesbaden, 2011, 53–69, here 63–66. This view is largely based on the interpretation of one passage in the book of Numbers, Num 15,14–15, the syntax of which is especially difficult. While it cannot be excluded that this passage marks the transition towards a closer integration of the resident alien into the sacral community, it remains uneasy, in my view, to connect it with a distinctive stage in the composition of Numbers (such as Albertz's P4-layer). Even so, it does not mean that the resident alien was regarded as a “full” member of the community, as Albertz himself emphasizes in his discussion of this passage.

60 For a critique of the notion that the resident alien, in H, has become a proselyte (together with the underlying model of a transformation of Israel from a political into a religious entity), see, e.g., Joosten, People and Land, 54–74; J. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 3A, New York et al., 2000, 1499. I also addressed this issue in a recent essay about the status of the gēr in H: cf. C. Nihan, Resident Aliens and Natives in the Holiness Legislation, in R. Achenbach, R. Albertz and J. Wöhrle (eds.), The Foreigner and the Law: Perspectives from the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, BZAR 16, Wiesbaden, 2011, 111–134.

61 See Nihan, Resident Aliens and Natives, 120.

62 See, e.g., J. E. Ramírez Kidd, Alterity and Identity in Israel: The גר in the Old Testament, BZAW 283, Berlin, 1999, 51–53; likewise Nihan, Resident Aliens and Natives, 120.

63 As correctly observed by Joosten, People and Land, 63–64.

64 Hutton, Narrative in Leviticus, 158–160, has correctly perceived the significance of the mention of the resident alien for the interpretation of Lev 24, but he tends (if I understand him correctly) to regard this story as a reflection about the general issue of whether the resident alien is subject to the laws that govern Israel, thus basically returning to a position similar to the one argued by Crüsemann and others.

65 M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, Oxford, 1972, 227–232; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1417–1419. Note, however, that for Weinfeld the concern of the priestly legislators was merely the “holiness of the land” (Deuteronomy, 228–229). This view is not correct because the land in H (as in P already) is not holy, but pure; only the sanctuary and the priests are holy. The interpretation advocated by Weinfeld and Milgrom has been adopted since by various commentators; cf. Joosten, People and Land, 66–70.205; Ramírez Kidd, Alterity, 63–64; M. Zehnder, Umgang mit Fremden in Israel und Assyrien. Ein Beitrag zur Anthropologie des “Fremden” im Licht antiker Quellen, BWANT 168, Stuttgart, 2005, 329.

66 For a recent restatement and a detailed discussion, see Nihan, Resident Aliens and Natives, 124–129.

67 Translation adapted from NRSV. The relationship between the verbs ḥnp and ṭmʾ in this passage is not entirely clear and would require further discussion. The use of ḥnp Hiphil in connection with the land of Israel has a parallel in Jer 3,2 and may be taken from this passage. That the basic meaning of Hebrew kippēr is not “atone” but “wipe out”, “cleanse” (cf. Akk. kapāru: CAD K, s.v. kapāru, 178–180) has been established by several scholars and is now widely (though not unanimously) recognized; compare, e.g., B. A. Levine, In the Presence of the Lord: A Study of Cult and Some cultic Terms in Ancient Israel, SJLA 5, Leiden, 1974, 59–60.

68 Num 35,31–32, insists that no koper (“ransom”) can be accepted for murder, unless committed by inadvertence. The fact that this statement is placed immediately before v. 33–34 suggests that there may well be a play with the verb kippēr in 35,33 (even though the two words are probably not related etymologically: cf. B. J. Schwartz, The Prohibition Concerning the “Eating” of Blood in Leviticus 17, in G. A. Anderson & S.M. Olyan eds, Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel, JSOTSup 125, Sheffield, 1991, 34–66, here 54). If so, the meaning of v. 31–32.33–34 is the following: Because no koper can be accepted for murder, the only way in which kippēr (decontamination) can be effected for the land that has been defiled by blood is with the blood of the murderer.

69 The expression occurs later in some passages of Numbers: see Num 9,6.7; 19,11.13; 31,35.40.46. Otherwise, it is also found once in Ezekiel and once in Chronicles: cf. Ez 27,13; 1 Chr 5,21.

70 For this observation, see especially Ruwe, “Heiligkeitsgesetz”, 336. The parallel between Gen 9 and Lev 24 was already noted by D. Hoffmann, Leviticus, Vol. 2, Berlin, 1905, 315; among more recent commentators, see, e.g., Otto, Geschichte der Talion, 125–126; Grünwaldt, Heiligkeitsgesetz, 304–305.

71 For this reading, see, e.g., B. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History, SJLA 10, Leiden, 1975, 46; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AncB 3, New York, 1991, 705. In the context of Gen 9,5–6, this rendering fits well with the statement in v. 5 that Yahweh will personally see to the reparation of the bloodshed.

72 The Akkadian equivalent, ṣalmu II, has the basic meaning “effigy”, “image”, “figure” (e.g., of a deity), and by extension “representation”, “likeness”, etc.

73 Ruwe, “Heiligkeitsgesetz”, 334–337, rightly perceives that Lev 24,17–21, is a revision of Ex 21 from the perspective of Gen 9. But he mistakenly concludes that Gen 9,4–6, would also be “radicalized” in this process, because Lev 24,18 now prescribes a sanction for killing animals whereas nothing is said about this in Gen 9 (337). In my view, this difference is due to the fact that Gen 9,3–4, considers animals as part of the creation, whereas Lev 24,18 considers them as the property of other Israelites (i.e., domestic animals), as the use of the verb šlm Piel in Lev 24,18a indicates (see the discussion above, § 4, with note 42).

74 For a similar view connecting the literal application of talion in v. 19–20 with the Priestly notion that human beings are created in the semblance of the deity, see Luciani, Sainteté et pardon, 176.

75 Thus MT; the LXX has understood: “the holiness of his God”.

76 To my knowledge, the most elaborated attempt that was made to interpret Lev 24,10–23, against the background of the concept of ṣelem ʾaelohîm in P is by Simeon Chavel. Unfortunately, I have had access to his work only through an excerpt in Milgrom's commentary, see Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2140–2145. Chavel rightly perceives that the ṣelem ʾaelohîm is the key to understanding the association being made in this story between blasphemy and murder. However, his view that the effect of this juxtaposition is to identify blasphemy with a form of “deicide” is not convincing. In my opinion, the point of this association is not so much to transform blasphemy into deicide as to reinterpret murder as a form of sacrilege. This conclusion is also consistent with the fact that, in the arrangement of Lev 24,10–23, the issue of murder is addressed after blasphemy and is clearly subordinated to the latter. The importance of the concept of ṣelem ʾaelohîm for understanding Lev 24 is also correctly emphasized in the recent study by Kamionkowski, Leviticus 24,10–23, especially 81–82. However, my interpretation of this passage differs significantly from hers, especially as regards the meaning of v. 15b–16 (see the discussion above, § 3). Other recent commentators have not perceived the importance of the ṣelem ʾaelohîm for interpreting the legal and religious background of Lev 24,10–23,; compare, e.g., Ruwe, “Heiligkeitsgesetz”, 334–337.

77 This reading is basically in agreement with the basic insight of some scholars who have correctly perceived that one basic issue in the story of Lev 24,10–23, was the observance of Yahweh's holiness inside the camp, represented by Yahweh's name, on one hand, and human life, on the other. See, e.g., B. D. Bibb, This Is the Thing the Lord Commanded You, PhD Dissertation, Princeton, 2005, 214–215 (cf. Id., Ritual Words and Narrative Worlds in Leviticus, The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 480, New York, 2008); similarly L. M. Trevaskis, The Purpose of Leviticus 24, 311. However, these scholars have usually not perceived that what connects blasphemy and murder, in Lev 24,10–23, is the legal category of sacrilege.

78 On this notion in Lev 25 in the context of H, see Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentaeuch, 533–535. As correctly observed by some scholars, this notion is clearly reminiscent of the laws governing temple estates in Mesopotamia: Joosten, People and Land, 181ff.; as well as M. Bauks, Die Begriffe מורטה und אחזה in Pg. Überlegungen zur Landkonzeption der Priestergrundschrift, ZAW 116 (2004), 171–188. This trend is further developed in Chronicles, where it has likewise been possible to show that the presence in Chronicles of a genre of temple duty roster (1 Chron 23–27) was based on the genre found in Mesopotamian temples, especially at Uruk; see J. W. Wright, “‘Those Doing the Work for the Service in the House of the Lord’. 1 Chronicles 23:6–24:31 and the Sociohistorical Context of the Temple of Yahweh in Jerusalem in the Late Persian/Early Hellenistic Period”, in O. Lipschits, G. N. Knoppers and R. Albertz (eds.), Judah and the Judeans in the Fourth Century B.C.E., Winona Lake, In, 2007, 361–384.

79 Several recent attempts to address the issue of the place of Lev 24,10–23, within H have focused on the relationship between 24,10–23, and 24,1–9,. See, e.g., L. M. Trevaskis, The Purpose of Leviticus 24. Trevaskis takes up an earlier observation by W. Warning, Literary Artistry in Leviticus, Leiden, 1999, 95, according to whom there may be a “conscious semantic link” between the expressions “outside the curtain of the testimony” (Lev 24,3) and “outside the camp” (24,14.23). He combines this with B. D. Bibb's idea (see above, note 77) that Lev 24,10–23, extends the ideal of cultic holiness exemplified by Lev 24,1–9, to the everyday life of Israel, and concludes that: “Lev 24 encourages its readers to commit themselves to the faithful observance of the various days, festivals and years, stipulated in Lev 23 and 25. On such occasions, the Israelites are to embody the ideal Israel symbolically presented in Lev 24:1–9 and avoid the fate of the blasphemer graphically portrayed in Lev 24:10–23” (312). There are, however, some difficulties with this interpretation. I do not find the parallel between the expressions “outside the curtain” and “outside the camp” very compelling, especially because the two situations are so different. On the other hand, there are indeed many connections between Lev 24,1–9, and Lev 23, so that it is possible to argue that 24,1–9, is a “complement” of sorts to the calendar of chap. 23 (see Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 511–512, with earlier references). If so, the case of 24,10–23, is distinct from 24,1–9, and the connection between these two passages, which is marked neither at the level of language, of form or of content, should not be overemphasized. However, as suggested above, I would accept the notion that a contrast is created in the present form of Lev 24 between the performance of daily and weekly rituals inside the sanctuary (v. 1–9) and abstention from sacrilege inside the camp (v. 10–23), and that within the arrangement of chaps 24 and 25 one can identify a concentric scheme going from the sanctuary to the camp and finally to the entire land.

80 Several commentators have rightly perceived that the rewriting and revision of Ex 21 in Lev 24 had to do with the origin of the Leviticus passage within “priestly” circles in early postexilic Yehud. Compare, e.g., Jackson, Semiotics, 296–297, or, from a different perspective, Ruwe, “Heiligkeitsgesetz”, 334–337 (but contrast Westbrook, Law of Talion, 68–69, who regards it apparently as a purely “scribal” phenomenon). However, few attempts have been made to address in detail the historical background of this “priestly” revision, and to correlate it with social, political and economic transformations of the temple and the priesthood during the Persian period.

81 See, e.g., J. Stackert, Rewriting the Torah: Literary Revision in Deuteronomy and the Holiness Legislation, FAT 52, Tübingen, 2007.

82 For a dating of H after Nehemiah, see E. Otto, Das Deuteronomium im Pentateuch und Hexateuch. Studien zur Literaturgeschichte von Pentateuch und Hexateuch im Lichte des Deuteronomiumrahmens, FAT 30, Tübingen, 2000, 196–211; Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch, 545–559. The Priestly narrative (Pg) is classically dated to the late Neo-Babylonian or early Persian period (second half of the 6th century), whereas the addition of ritual laws in Lev 1–16 and elsewhere (some of which are clearly based upon earlier material) is dated to the 5th century.

83 See, e.g., Ramírez Kidd, Alterity, 69–71; L. S. Fried, From Xeno-Philia to -Phobia. Jewish Encounters with the Other, in Y. Levin ed., A Time of Change. Judah and Its Neighbours in the Persian and Early Hellenistic Periods, LSTS 65, London and New York, 2007, 179–204; most recently Nihan, Resident Aliens and Natives, 131, with additional references.

84 For this late “priestly” revision in Numbers, see Achenbach, Vollendung der Tora, 130–140.141–172 and 443–633.

85 L. S. Fried, The Priest and the Great King, Temple-Palace Relations in the Persian Empire, Biblical and Judaic Studies 10, Winona Lake, In, 2004; see especially the fifth chapter (156–223).

86 B. Porten and A. Yardeni, Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt, 4 vols, Jerusalem, 1986–1999, Vol. 1, 68–71. The first draft of the this letter (A4.7) mentions in l. 18–19 a previous letter that was sent three years before (410 BCE) to Bagohi, governor of Judah, as well as to the high priest and the priests of Jerusalem, along with Judean notables, who presumably resided likewise in the city.

87 See J. Schaper, The Jerusalem Temple as an Instrument of the Achaemenid Fiscal Administration, VT 45 (1995), 528–539; and more recently on this issue, compare for instance A. Lemaire, Administration in the Fourth-Century B.C.E. Judah in Light of Epigraphy and Numismatics, O. Lipschits, G. Knoppers and R. Albertz eds, Judah and the Judeans in the Fourth Century B.C.E., Winona Lake, In, 2007, 53–74.

88 On this issue, see the detailed discussion by D. Rooke, Zadok's Heirs. The Role and Development of the High Priesthood in Ancient Israel, OTM, Oxford, 2000, esp. 135–150, although she extends this conclusion to the entire Persian period; on this point, see further below. Cf. also the similar remarks by W. H. Rose, Zemah and Zerubbabel. Messianic Expectations in the Early Postexilic Period, JSOTSup 304, Sheffield, 2000, 44–83. In my view, the notion that the role of the high priest was limited to cultic matters, especially within the pr-cincts of the sanctuary, is confirmed by the statement found in Zech 3,7 about the high priest Joshua. As shown by M. Segal, The Responsibilities and Rewards of Joshua the High Priest According to Zechariah 3:7, JBL 126, 2007, 717–734, this passage is “a conditional promise given to Joshua at the beginning of his term as high priest” that if he properly fulfills his priestly responsibilities “his dynasty will be guaranteed” (733). Furthermore, as shown by Segal, these responsibilities can all be understood as referring to cultic charges, especially with respect to the maintenance of the structure of the temple and its precincts. Segal rightly concludes that this passage cannot be viewed as evidence for a changed status of priesthood in the period following the reconstruction of the temple. Whether or not Zech 3,1–7, alludes to a form of priestly ascent to heaven – a point which Segal explicitly refutes – is another issue, which need not be addressed here. On Zech 3,7, compare also the relevant comment by Rose, Zemah, 83: “In Zech. 3.7, Joshua, the high priest, is given certain prerogatives which formerly belonged to the king, but these are limited to the temple and its cult. No reasons are given for this transfer, and details are unclear. Evidence for increased civil power of the priest is absent, and so is evidence for a form of government called ‘diarchy’”.

89 For presentation of this fractional coin, see Y. Meshorer, A Treasury of Jewish Coins from the Persian Period to Bar-Kochba, Jerusalem, 2001, 14 n. 20; as well as the detailed discussion by L. S. Fried, A Silver Coin of Yohanan Hakkôhen, Transeuphratène 26, 2003, 65–85 with Pls. II–IV.

90 E.g., Lemaire, Administration, esp. 62.

91 On Num 27,21 as a reflection of the growing authority of the Judean priesthood during the Persian period, see now I. Kislev, The Investiture of Joshua (Numbers 27:12–23) and the Dispute on the Form of Leadership in Yehud, VT 59, 2009, 429–445. I disagree with his view that Num 27,21 belongs to a late revision of an earlier account in v. 12–23*, but this point is not relevant here. For a more comprehensive assessment of the presentation of the high priest in Numbers in relation with social and political changes during the Persian period, see Achenbach, Vollendung der Tora, 443–633.

92 Although some scholars have recently argued that the Holiness legislation was meant to replace other, earlier codes such as the Covenant Code and the Deuteronomic Code (e.g., Stackert, Rewriting the Torah, esp. 211–224), it seems difficult to see how this model could be applied to Lev 24,10–23,. Obviously, the story of the blasphemer does not intend to replace the criminal legislation of the Covenant Code, and entire portions of that legislation are not covered whatsoever. Rather, the author of Lev 24,10–23, picks up various elements in the criminal legislation of the Covenant Code (especially in Ex 21), and rearranges or reinterprets them for his own purpose. In this process, some gaps perceived in the earlier legislation of the Covenant Code (such as, e.g., the absence of a sanction for blasphemy, Ex 22,27) are filled, and – above all – the correct interpretation of earlier legal sentences (such as especially death penalty for murder, Ex 21,12, and talion, Ex 21,23b.24) is stated. All this suggests that, by the time when Lev 24,10–23, was composed, the Holiness legislation was not meant to replace the Covenant Code, but to supplement and stand alongside this code.

93 R. Achenbach, Das Heiligkeitsgesetz und die sakralen Ordnungen des Numeribuches im Horizont der Pentateuchredaktion, in T. Römer ed., The Books of Leviticus and Numbers, BEThL 215, Leuven et al., 2008, 145–175.